The humanitarian–development nexus in Northern Uganda by Lie, Jon Harald Sande
1Policy Brief
The humanitarian–development nexus 
in Northern Uganda
 
Jon Harald Sande Lie
Humanitarian action and development aid constitute two 
important segments of the international apparatus. While 
they generally share the objective of aiding civilians, the two 
segments consist of different actors with distinct rationales 
receiving funding from separate donor drawers. Much has 
been written on the conflicting interests and interface of mili-
tary rationales on the one side, and the joint civilian dimen-
sions of humanitarianism and development on the other,1  
particularly in hotspot areas such as Afghanistan, Darfur and 
Iraq. While their cooperation are warranted as a way to ease 
the war-to-peace transition, humanitarian actors remain cau-
tions of being too closely associated with military and politi-
cal actors in fear of jeopardising the humanitarian principles 
of impartiality, neutrality and independence that guide their 
work. Similar dynamics and boundary work occur in the inter-
face between humanitarianism and development, but it is less 
frequently attended to as they to outsiders are understood 
merely as a composite, civilian segment. This policy note 
con siders this dynamics in light of the recent transition from 
humanitarian action to development aid in northern Uganda. 
Decades of civil war in Northern Uganda produced a protracted 
humanitarian crisis, which saw the internal displacement of 
nearly two million civilians and the involvement of a plethora 
of humanitarian actors. Although the notorious rebel group the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been pushed out of Uganda, 
humanitarian concerns and challenges are still lingering today. 
Yet, 2008 arguably marked the beginning of the end of the 
humanitarian crisis and involvement in Northern Uganda. The 
Government of Uganda started to recast the former crisis as being 
one of recovery and development. This weakened the operational 
consent to and financial basis of the humanitarian apparatus 
providing civilian protection and basic services. The discursive 
recast was more a result of the government’s ambition to reassert 
its humanitarian sovereignty in the area than a reflection of sig-
nificant improvements in the region and the civilian’s livelihood 
in the post-conflict era and area.
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erning the world of peoples. Cambridge, Polity Press; McNeish, John and 
Jon Harald Sande Lie, Eds. (2010). Security and Development. New York, 
Berghahn Books.
 Responding to the depleted funding situation, most humani-
tarian actors started to withdraw, phasing out their activities 
– arguably “too soon, too fast and with too much unfinished 
business”, as stated by an informant. Other humanitarian 
actors, however, recognising the persistent humanitarian 
needs and concerns instead reoriented their support. They 
reframed their engagement as development to maintain what 
they saw as their key mission – helping civilians, regardless 
the situation’s formal rendering, forms of funding and whether 
it potentially infringes on the humanitarian principles. 
The case of the transition from humanitarian action to devel-
opment aid in Northern Uganda demonstrates institutional 
inconsistencies and a discrepancy between how the humani-
tarian principles are being practiced by various actors. The 
case invites reflection over the nature and future of humani-
tarianism and how humanitarian challenges are changing 
humanitarian practice, or, conversely, how humanitarian 
changes are challenging the instituted orders of humanitar-
ian practice and principles. The case stimulates reflecting 
over when and who to draw the line for what constitutes a 
humanitarian crisis, and how humanitarian actors relate and 
respond to changes in their operational environment. More 
profoundly, it raises the question: to what extent is there a 
hierarchy, or contradiction, between the humanitarian prin-
ciples and more pragmatic approaches to save lives and pro-
tect civilians regardless how the situation is formally defined? 
Humanitarianism and Development – Worlds apart?
The segments of humanitarian action and development aid 
largely draw on two distinct logics that often appear at odds 
with each other.  Humanitarianism’s ethics and imminent 
needs-based approaches building the principles of neutral-
ity, impartiality and independence –  together providing for 
the physical and conceptual ‘humanitarian space’ in which 
humanitarian actors operate – are fundamentally different 
from the more long-term, political, rights-based development 
approaches. While the intended beneficiaries of international 
aid tend to be indifferent or unaware of these differences, their 
distinctiveness matter for practitioners and operational activi-
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ties, causing for great philosophical disputes in the confer-
ence rooms. This, in turn, has effects for the beneficiaries and 
operational humanitarian activities. These nominal schisms 
are less conspicuous in practical, operational work. 
Increasingly the humanitarian and development segments 
of the international system rub shoulders, sometimes even 
overlapping and challenging each other, causing for what 
has been described as a humanitarian mission creep, i.e. the 
expansion of the humanitarian project beyond its original 
remit. For instance, this is witnessed in how humanitarian 
action has moved from its rationale of saving lives there and 
then (i.e. the humanitarian present), during a crisis, regard-
less of who and where, to activities and interventions taking 
place before and after the crisis. Prevention and recovery 
activities to build lasting peace are increasingly seen to be 
integral to humanitarian action – but “as humanitarians 
began imagining how to build peace after [or before] war, 
they slipped into building states”2 – a highly political activity 
typically the domain of development actors. The humanitar-
ian mission creep challenges the humanitarian principles 
of neutrality, impartiality and independence and, in turn, 
humanitarian organisations’ legitimacy. 
The humanitarian mission creep is far from driven only by 
organisations’ greater ambitions or as a way to increase their 
budgets. It is partly also due to how the war-to-peace transition 
increasingly is being seen as a continuum and not as consist-
ing of compartmentalised phases calling for distinct actors. But 
more importantly, the mission creep is also driven by changing 
contextual factors, new conflict formations and dynamics in the 
field in which humanitarian actors operate.  The case of Uganda 
illustrates well how humanitarian organizations navigate this 
challenging terrain, balancing between pragmatic approaches 
and the more idealized understandings of humanitarianism.
Northern Uganda: conflict to recovery; humanitarian-
ism to development? 
In 2005, at the peak of the civil war between the Government 
of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) there were 
roughly 1,8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) living in 
251 different ‘protected camps’ across 11 districts in Northern 
Uganda. The roots of the conflict dates back to 1986 when cur-
rent President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance 
Army (MRA) overthrew former president Tito Okello, who came 
from the northern Acholi tribe. Museveni came to power prom-
ising to restore stability, security and respect for human rights. 
People from the northern parts were, however, antagonistic 
to a government led by a person from the south. Museveni’s 
policies of downplaying ethnicity as a political, organising 
principle were seen as a way to undermine the political voices 
of the north, creating further trepidation in the north, causing 
rebel groups to emerge. Multiple insurgencies emerged from 
Acholiland, of which the Joseph Kony-led LRA would eventu-
ally rise as the most enduring and destructive rebel movement.
In response, the government in 1996 escalated its fight against 
the LRA through its scorched-earth policy. This included 
ordering all Acholis to vacate their homes in 48 hours, forcing 
them to resettle in ‘protected camps’, thus swiftly turning the 
citizens into internally displaced people (IDPs). The ration-
ale was to separate civilians and combatants in order for the 
Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to identify and target 
the combatants. The government invoked a humanitarian rea-
soning for the encampment process, arguing the camps would 
enable the UPDF to better offer physical protection. Seeing the 
political aspects of the insurgency, however, allows analysing 
the encampment and recasting the civilians as IDPs deprived 
of their civil rights as a way to control and quell political oppo-
sition from arising in the north, thus being instrumental in the 
Kampala-based state formation process. 
The so-called ‘protected camps’ did not receive sufficient 
physi cal protection as the UPDF used its limited resources 
to focus on fighting the LRA and not protecting the civilians. 
This left the camp borders porous, allowing the LRA to hide 
and attack within the camps. The civilians, moreover, were 
forced to move outside the camps to maintain agricultural 
production, collect firewood, go to the markets and so on, as 
there was a critical lack of services and provisions within the 
camp. Leaving the camps to sustain their livelihood, the civil-
ians feared not only being attacked by the LRA, but also being 
associated with the LRA and consequently repri manded by the 
UPDP since the government’s policy criminalised out-of-camp 
activities. Together, the LRA atrocities, the UPDP’s response to 
the LRA and the government’s encampment policies and poor 
camp management produced a massive humanitarian crisis. 
International humanitarian assistance was gradually phased 
in to help respond to the ensuing humanitarian crisis and to 
provide camp management and basic services. In response, 
the government reallocated its camp funding into the UPDF, 
making the humanitarian involvement at least partly com-
plicit in sustaining the conflict as it allowed the govern-
ment to focus on a military and not political solution to the 
conflict, while international humanitarian actors assumed 
responsibility for managing the camps. Meanwhile, most 
state building and development activities in the north were 
lying fallow with neither funding nor focus from the govern-
ment and international actors. 
Northern Uganda experienced a dramatic expansion of exter-
nally funded, humanitarian civil society organisations from 
the late 1990. The intervening humanitarian regime had its 
primary function in administrating camp populations, caus-
ing civilians to be self-disciplined into non-political forms 
of organisation rather than empowered to pursue their own 
aspiration. The massive influx of humanitarian actors pro-
liferated after the head of UN OCHA, Jan Egeland, in 2003 
brought attention to the conflict, describing it as the worst 
forgotten humanitarian crisis on earth, followed by pledges 
and appeals to beef up relief operations. The ensuing CNN-
effect made humanitarian funding skyrocket, from $34 
million in 2002 to its 2008 peak of $238 million, causing 
Northern Uganda, in the words of an informant, to suffer 
from NGO-obesity, creating an aid-based civil society and an 
economy almost entirely determined by external funding. 
The peak of the external involvement in 2008 also marked 
the beginning of the end of the humanitarian crisis – at least 
2 Barnett, Michael, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ith-
aca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), p: 3.
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nominally – as the government started a process of recasting 
the situation from being one of humanitarian crisis to one of 
recovery and development in order to reclaim its sovereignty 
in Northern Uganda. Instrumental in this move was the gov-
ernment’s closure of the ‘protected camps’, thus forcing the 
internally displaced population to return to their ancestral 
fields which had been lying fallow for over a decade. The gov-
ernment’s discursive recast of the situation happened partly 
in response to how the humanitarian actors undermined the 
state through their comprehensive operations and antagonis-
ing advocacy work, and partly because the UPDF had pushed 
the LRA out of Uganda. The government took the Kampala-
based donors to the north, showing them that people were 
returning home, that the camps were being closed and that the 
conflict was over as the LRA had been pushed into the neigh-
bouring countries. Only seeing the surface of the situation, the 
donors were persuaded that the crisis was over and to move 
their funding from humanitarian activities into development 
aid, notably in the form of budget support to the government’s 
own recovery and reconstruction plans in the north. 
The transition happened in spite of the persistent humani-
tarian sufferings and needs in the post-conflict period. The 
recast had detrimental effects for ongoing activities – “too 
many NGOs withdrew too soon with too much unfinished 
business”, an informant claimed, arguably leaving a human-
itarian vacuum for the many civilians who after years in 
the protected camps were forced to leave, returning to their 
homelands and districts which in the meantime had received 
minimal government and donor attention regarding social 
and infrastructure development. 
Admittedly, representatives of local authorities, humani-
tarian and development NGOs and community leaders all 
expressed that there no longer was an ongoing crisis per se 
given that the armed conflict had ended, which warranted 
a move into recovery and development. Yet, they held there 
were numerous concerns with the immediate camp closure 
and the depleting humanitarian funding. Although the LRA 
had been pushed out of Uganda, it still waged attacks from 
neighbouring DRC and South Sudan, although the frequency 
was gradually reduced as the LRA was pushed further into 
these countries, including the Central African Republic. 
The sudden decommissioning of the IDP-camps undermined 
the sustainability of the humanitarian’s work. The process of 
replacement was, moreover, full of tensions as the IDPs them-
selves was never consulted about their repatriation as stated 
by the principles of Durable Solutions for IDPs. Formally, the 
government subscribed to these principles. In practice, how-
ever, the authorities wanted the displaced people to return to 
their rural homes as quickly as possible, arguably as a way to 
reclaim its humanitarian sovereignty and as a token of stabil-
ity and the transition to recovery. 
The returning IDPs, however, were faced with a collapsed 
state apparatus that had received little attention from both 
donors and the central state during the decades of armed 
conflict, during which the many NGOs in effect had replaced 
the state in terms of service delivery and protection efforts. 
The humanitarian activities during the crisis had, moreover, 
addressed the immediate and present concerns, but in so 
doing the intervening actors neglected foreseeing the future, 
post-conflict needs and concerns. Land rights, in particular, 
became a critical hotspot causing for violent conflict. Many 
families saw their land they were forced to move from appro-
priated when returning from the camps, causing for legal 
disputes erupting into violent conflict due to the lack of for-
malised tenure and a penal system to settle the conflicts.
 
The camp closure not only degraded the livelihood funda-
ment and basic services provided by the humanitarian actors. 
The ensuing forced resettlement also deconstructed the social 
fabric that had been established within the camps. Together, 
this exacerbated humanitarian concerns and needs in the 
post-camp, recovery phase – a phase ordinary char acterised 
by hope and optimism. As reported by representatives of the 
community, civil society and local authorities, basic health 
and social protection services remained extrem ely weak in 
areas recovering from decades of armed con flict, particularly 
as the humanitarian actors were phasing out after losing their 
rationale and operational consent. Other concerns invariably 
reported include children’s rights, sex ual and gender based 
violence, poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, violence, 
conflict over access and rights to land, unexploded ordi-
nances and weapons, illiteracy and a gene ral lack of basic 
services such as health, education and water. 
Responding to the transition – principles and pragmatics
Are these concerns of a humanitarian or development charac-
ter? Within which realm do they fall – or does it matter? These 
post-conflict concerns are not endemic or limited to Northern 
Uganda. Indeed, perhaps with the exemption of the conten-
tious land rights, all other issues are found throughout the 
country where they are seen as tokens of underdevelopment. 
The main difference, however, is the magnitude and complex-
ity of these issues caused by decades of conflict. These issues, 
moreover, became exacerbated due to limited attention given 
to infrastructure development and state building during the 
conflict, together giving these concerns both a temporal and 
spatial diffusion outreaching any other national context. 
Generally, the humanitarians’ response can be grouped in 
three categories: 1)those who withdrew according to their 
mandate; 2) those who relocated their operations; and 3) 
those who refocused and reorganised their aid activities. Of 
the first category, one typically finds the UNHCR, the ICRC 
and the MSF. UNHCR had to withdraw as it is dependent on 
both the government’s consent and the donors’ finances. The 
ICRC and MSF, who are seen as gatekeepers and guardians of 
the humanitarian principles, withdrew with reference to their 
mandate as they situation moved into recovery and develop-
ment. They acknowledged the critical situation and the per-
sistent needs, but feared breaching humanitarian principles, 
explicitly invoking a hierarchy by holding humanitarian 
principles over pragmatic approaches. The second category 
involved several larger, international NGOs that sought to 
pay heed to the humanitarian principles while remaining 
operational in Uganda, which were enabled by relocating 
to the north-eastern Karamoja-region where the indigenous 
pastoralists’ cattle raiding dynamics, climate change, land 
scarcity and nomadic transborder movement were seen as an 
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emerging humanitarian hotspot requiring intervention. The 
third category involves organisations that took a more prag-
matic stance to the discursive recast of the situation in the 
north and its consent and funding implications. Disagreeing 
about the underpinning assessment and recognising the 
persistent concerns, some actors reframed their support in 
terms of development aid, which warranted both operational 
legitimacy and external, financial support. Despite scaling 
down their activities due to the plummeting funds, these 
organisations gradually aligned themselves with regular 
development activities, such as building schools, education, 
reproductive health, vocational and livelihood training, agri-
cultural extension programmes, and reintegration projects.
 
To some, notably those in the first category, this ‘third way’ 
response was seen as somewhat controversial and a hollow-
ing of the humanitarian space and principles, as it connected 
erstwhile humanitarian actors not only to the politics of aid 
but also to the government’s state building and recovery 
programme. In the words of an informant responding to this 
critique, “we are committed to helping people in need, not 
to maintaining some abstract principles”.. These different 
responses alert us to the heterogeneity of humanitarianism: 
multiple organisations operate under the same humanitar-
ian umbrella and lend legitimacy from its morally charged 
principles and values, although the organisations might not 
share the same interpretation and understanding of what 
these principles mean and entail in practice.3 The malle-
ability of the humanitarian principles and concepts make 
for a knowledge battlefield where different actors represent-
ing different organizational cultures and mandates vie over 
humanitarianism’s meaning, interpretation and application 
in practice. This malleability is to some seen as a way to be 
pragmatic about humanitarian challenges and principles 
by enabling more diverse and context sensitive operational 
action – meaning that the end justifies the mean. Conversely, 
others see the malleability as undermining the humanitarian 
principles and the legitimacy they provide for, thus curtail-
ing room to manoeuvre on the basis of humanitarianism.
 
Conclusion
The instituted orders and structures of humanitarianism are 
changing. Forces both external and internal to humanitarian-
ism are significantly challenging the humanitarian principles’ 
regulatory hold over humanitarian practice. The case of the 
transition from humanitarian action to development aid in 
Northern Uganda illustrates important humanitarian changes 
and challenges. As the case demonstrates, the humanitarian 
mission creep is driven by interrelated factors both external 
and internal to the humanitarian field. Externally, the recast 
of the situation into one of recovery impinged on the govern-
ment’s consent and donors’ funding of the humanitarian 
activities. Internally, realising the lingering and persistent 
effects of the Civil War, several humanitarian organisations 
reoriented their support in terms of development in order to 
continue to assist the civilian population, thus taking a prag-
matic stance favouring the civilians’ needs. 
The discursive recast of the situation in Northern Uganda as 
being one of recovery and development instead of crisis not 
only demonstrates the troublesome transition between two, 
at times, distinct institutional realms of the international sys-
tem. The way in which various humanitarian organisations 
responded differently to this discursive recast also demonstrate 
a burgeoning humanitarian–development nexus and the way in 
which this nexus is driven by factors both internal and external 
to the field of humanitarianism itself. These factors are inter-
related, meaning that the evolving humanitarian–development 
nexus is driven by both the organisations’ expanding scope 
as a response to new and changing field circumstances. This, 
in turn, thus relates to the more general and ongoing debates 
about the evolving humanitarian mission creep, questioning 
the hierarchy between the humanitarian ethos of helping civil-
ians and the sanctity of the humanitarian principles.
3 Benjamin de Carvalho and Jon Harald Sande Lie, “Chronicle of a Frustra-
tion Foretold? The Implementation of a broad Protection Agenda in the 
United Nations”, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3–4 (2011): 
341–362; Lie, Jon Harald Sande and Benjamin de Carvalho (2010). “Be-
tween culture and concept: the protection of civilians in Sudan.” Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 14(1-2): 60-85
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